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23. Gender and hate crime protections
Marian Duggan
In 2018, the Law Commission for England and Wales indicated that a public consultation 
would be held on whether or not to extend current ‘hate crime’ laws to include, among other 
things, gender. Hate crime is the colloquial term for a range of criminal offences involving 
harassment, victimisation or violence which are motivated by a perpetrator’s hostility towards 
the victim’s actual or presumed identity. This hostility must be against one of the five currently 
recognised ‘protected characteristics’: racial identity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, 
disability and gender identity.1 If the hostility is based on gender alone then this is not cur-
rently recognised as grounds for hate crime protection in England and Wales.
For many women, gender can be – and has been – an important factor in their experience of 
hate crime, particularly when this intersects with a recognised protected characteristic in a way 
which heightens their vulnerability to victimisation. Homophobic abuse directed at a lesbian 
necessarily involves hostility towards both her sexual orientation and gender. Islamophobia 
towards a Muslim woman who wears the hijab or niqab is marked out for religious hostility by 
clothing determined by her gender.2 The substantial global body of work focusing specifically 
on gender-based violence (GBV), particularly that which pertains to violence against women 
and girls (VAWG), has highlighted women’s vulnerability to violent victimisation seemingly 
on the basis of gender alone. For this reason, some scholars and activists have called for gender 
to be included as a recognised protected characteristic and legislated for accordingly in line 
with existing hate crimes. Others have opposed this, citing that VAWG is a significant and 
heterogenous area in its own right, so should remain set apart in law and policy in order to 
recognise the particular vulnerabilities facing women as a result of individual and structural 
patriarchal oppression.3 In light of this, more recent debates have suggested that it is misogyny, 
not gender, which should be considered for inclusion.
This chapter explores issues around gender, misogyny and hate crime protections in 
England and Wales. It begins by considering gender as a basis for hostility, concentrating 
specifically on the VAWG scholarship to unpack what is known about gendered hatred and 
targeted victimisation. It then addresses the hate crimes scholarship to ascertain how demar-
1 ‘Gender identity’ refers to people who incur hostility because of their actual or presumed gen-
dervariant identity, therefore people who identify as transgender or anyone who does not identify 
with their assigned sex/gender at birth. Sex is commonly used to refer to the biological demarcation of 
a person as male or female, while gender is understood to be the social construction of qualities defined 
as masculine or feminine, which may be more or less present in people who identify as either male or 
female. For a more informed discussion about the relevance and impact of these concepts, see A Oakley 
(1991/2016) Sex, Gender and Society, London: Routledge.    
2 I Zempi (2016) ‘“It’s a part of me, I feel naked without it”: Choice, Agency and Identity for 
Muslim Women Who Wear the Niqab’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(10): 1738–54.
3 For a comprehensive overview of this debate, see A Gill and H Mason-Bish (2013) ‘Addressing 
Violence Against Women as a Form of Hate Crime: Limitations and Possibilities’, Feminist Review 105: 
1–20.
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cated offences are recognised and responded to in law, as well as debates around the strengths 
and limitations of such categorisation. Finally, the chapter brings these discussions together 
to assess the potential of addressing gender-based hostility within a hate crimes framework, 
illustrating how this already happens in cases where victimisation is intersectional in nature. 
The chapter concludes by suggesting that efforts need to go further than merely expanding 
legislation and criminalisation processes if gender-based or misogynistic victimisation is to be 
effectively reduced and redressed.
1. GENDER AS A BASIS FOR HOSTILITY
Sex and gender are understood as separate, but related, concepts. A person’s sex is predom-
inantly determined at birth through biological markers (usually chromosomal and genital) 
which indicate whether they are male or female. Gender, on the other hand, is a set of socially 
constructed qualities which differentiate between masculinity and femininity, indicating 
the traits, behaviours and expectations affiliated to (and expected from) people demarcated 
as ‘male’ or ‘female’.4 Traditional conceptualisations of male and female/masculinity and 
femininity are increasingly less rigid due to significant cultural developments,5 as well as 
sociolegal ones.6 While some have sought to deconstruct gender identities and roles, others 
have highlighted how women’s experiences of harm from men are inherently gendered, with 
each perspective being used to reinforce arguments for recognising either gender or misogyny 
as a protected characteristic.
In many societies the term ‘gender’ has become synonymous with ‘women’ or issues relat-
ing to women. Gender chapters in academic textbooks often focus on how the issue affects 
women specifically: the ‘Gender and Crime’ chapters in criminology texts ordinarily depict 
issues relating to women as offenders and victims.7 What is overlooked is how the remainder 
of the textbook is also gendered male; but as crime is a predominantly male occupation, the 
‘maleness’ of criminal enterprise is less evidently acknowledged.8 Gendered discourses also 
obscure male victims of sexual and domestic abuse, rendering these areas subject to much less 
academic inquiry than their female counterparts. Gender is clearly relevant here: much of what 
has been researched about victimisation has been by women (often feminist) researchers; male 
4 In many respects, contemporary UK society has moved beyond this gender binary to recognise 
people who identify as transgender, agender, genderqueer, gender nonconforming and so forth. Official 
mechanisms, such as the gender recognition certificate, now exist to allow a person to amend their legally 
recorded gender.
5 The increase in language used to denote a wider range of gender identities, or abstention from such 
identification, coupled with movements to remove the need to register gender on formal documents are 
indicative of such cultural developments around gender. 
6 For example, women in the UK now have citizenship rights in relation to marriage, divorce and 
employment which allow for greater independence and financial autonomy, where before there would 
have been reliance on a male provider or guardian.
7 This is also the case for chapters on ‘race and ethnicity’ which will often focus on black and 
minority ethnic groups. 
8 See M Wykes and K Welsh (2009) Violence, Gender and Justice, London:: London; also, M 
Wykes and A Ellis (2013) ‘Bringing the Boys Back Home: Re-Engendering Criminology’, in: M 
Cowburn, M Duggan, A Robinson and P Senior (eds), Values in Criminology and Community Justice, 
Bristol: Policy Press, 77–92.
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researchers prefer researching about men’s offending, but even then, only some men’s offend-
ing is deemed worthy of investigation. The male agent remains invisible unless, as Wykes 
and Welsh suggest, ‘they can be labelled outside the dominant ideal of heterosexual, paternal 
masculinity as paedophiles, mad, evil or beasts’.9 Ensuring who specifically is being referred 
to when ‘gender’ is being addressed is therefore important to guarantee that assumptions are 
not being made or the nuance of experience is not obscured.
Exploring ‘gender-based violence’ (GBV) research – which may appear to be inclusive 
of all genders – illustrates that quite often this is specifically focused on the victimisation of 
women and girls by male perpetrators. This is important as, although globally the majority 
of victims of crime are male, their victimisation is usually at the hands of other men and is 
often in the pursuit of a broader criminal aim, so a gendered rationale is less evident.10 In other 
words, men’s violence towards other men is not usually because they are men, but because of 
something else linked to the violent enterprise. Women, on the other hand, constitute fewer 
victims of violence overall, but a disproportionately higher number of domestic and sexual 
violence victims. Women are predominantly harmed by men, and often men they know, which 
indicates a gendered dynamic to the victimisation.11 Therefore, while violent victimisation 
is an issue for both men and women, GBV and VAWG are necessarily gendered areas of 
sociolegal research, practice and policy because of the nature, frequency, rationale and (as 
will be discussed later in this chapter) supposed justifiability of some men’s violence towards 
women.12 This will also be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
Tackling the problem of men’s violence against women and girls has been at the forefront 
of Western feminist social and political campaigning for decades. The United Nations defined 
VAWG in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
as ‘violence directed at a woman because she is a woman or acts of violence which are suf-
fered disproportionately by women’.13 Examples include domestic violence, rape and sexual 
violence, sexual harassment, child sexual abuse, female genital mutilation, forced marriage, 
crimes in the name of ‘honour’,14 trafficking and sexual exploitation. Women are at risk of vio-
lence from male family members, colleagues and other acquaintances, but most from usually 
men with whom they are (or were) intimate. The World Health Organisation estimates that 35 
per cent of women worldwide will experience physical and/or sexual violence at some point in 
their lives,15 while the United Nations indicates that up to 70 per cent of women globally have 
experienced physical and/or sexual violence from an intimate partner specifically.16 Patriarchy 
9 M Wykes and M Welsh (2009) Violence, Gender and Justice, London: SAGE, at 3.
10 If there is a sexual orientation element to the crime, then this may not be the case. 
11 For example, sexual exploitation, dowry-related violence, female infanticide: see A Gill (2014) 
‘Honour’ Killing and Violence: Theory, Policy, Practice, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
12 See A Howe (2009) Sex, Violence and Crime: Foucault and the ‘Man’ Question. London: 
Routledge.
13 www .un .org/ womenwatch/ daw/ cedaw/ recommendations/ recomm .htm. 
14 The word ‘honour’ is often written in quotation marks to denote the contentious nature of implying 
that targeted victimisation against a person is done on an honourable basis. See A Gill (2014) ‘Honour’ 
Killing and Violence: Theory, Policy, Practice, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
15  World Health Organization, Department of Reproductive Health and Research, London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, South African Medical Research Council (2013) Global and Regional 
Estimates of Violence against Women: Prevalence and Health Effects of Intimate Partner Violence and 
Non-Partner Sexual Violence, at 2. 
16 UN Women, Global Database on Violence against Women.
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is evident in much of this violence, particularly when it is fatal; most domestic murders of 
women are by their male partner. Often, the reasons given are indicative of male entitlement: 
threats to his ‘honour’ through her supposed insubordination, promiscuity or infidelity; her 
rejecting him; her requesting a separation, and so forth.17 Family relations can make it difficult 
for victims to escape abuse, particularly if there is an expectation that women will remain in 
a relationship or face wider family condemnation. The Forced Marriage Unit provides direct 
support to hundreds of victims in the UK and overseas annually, while the United Nations esti-
mate that 5,000 women a year are victims of family-perpetrated ‘honour’ killings globally.18
2. FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER HOSTILITY
Feminist literature has analysed the power of violence as a tool of social control with regard 
to women’s bodies and behaviours, highlighting women’s disproportionate vulnerability to 
sexual and domestic abuse globally.19 Key theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon have high-
lighted how ‘women are sexually assaulted because they are women; not individually or at 
random, but on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender’.20 
Viewing violence against women in terms of isolated cases belies the wider patriarchal struc-
tures in place which empower abusers and seek to silence, repress or blame victims. Therefore, 
the promotion of a discourse which names this highly gendered dynamic has become evident; 
this section will explore how it feeds into discussions of recognising misogyny rather than 
gender in hate crime protections.
Diana Russell has suggested engaging the concept of femicide (as opposed to homicide) in 
men’s fatal violence towards women, as ‘naming an injustice, and thereby providing a means 
of thinking about it, usually precedes the creation of a movement against it’.21 Similarly, 
Carole Sheffield advocated that violence against women can be construed as a form of sexual 
terrorism which is ‘manifested through actual and implied violence; and all females irrespec-
tive of race, class, physical or mental abilities, and sexual orientation, are potential victims – at 
any age, at any time, or in any place’.22 Echoing Susan Brownmiller’s claims that rape is used 
by all men to keep all women in a state of fear all the time, Sheffield goes on to outline some 
of the activities which constitute sexual terrorism; these range from the harassment, abuse and 
rape of women of all ages through to prostitution, pornography and murder. These acts serve 
to keep women subordinated and regulated within a patriarchal framework of male entitlement 
over women, reiterating the need for a specific discourse of misogyny which focuses on vio-
lence against women and girls as opposed to a more generic gender rhetoric.
17 R Dobash, R Dobash and K Cavanagh (2009) ‘“Out of the Blue: Men who Murder an Intimate 
Woman Partner’, Feminist Criminology, 4(3): 194–225.
18 www .un .org/ en/ women/ endviolence/ pdf/ VAW .pdf. 
19 S Brownmiller (1975) Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, New York: Penguin.
20 C MacKinnon (1991) ‘Reflections on Sex Equality under Law’, Yale Law Journal, 100(5): 
1281–1328, at 1301.
21 J Radford and D Russell (1992) Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing, Woodbridge: Twayne 
Publishers Inc, at xiv.
22 C Sheffield (1987) ‘Sexual Terrorism and the Social Control of Women’ in B.B. Hess and M.M. 
Ferree (eds) Analysing Gender: A Handbook of Social Science Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
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These gendered experiences are argued to be illustrative of how all women have been con-
structed as potential victims of some men's violence. Such arguments are routinely critiqued 
for constituting women as previous, present or potential targets who must just accept that male 
victimisation is an inevitable fact of life. Similar sentiments are evident in violence prevention 
messages, which often target women (‘Don’t be a victim’) rather than men (‘Don’t victimise’). 
Constituting male victimisation of women as inevitable and responsibilising individual women 
for their own safety indicates that the focus on deflection is considered more achievable than 
actual prevention. These sentiments have informed several UK government-endorsed policies 
and campaigns which advertise, advise and warn about the dangers of sexual violence by 
visibly targeting women, suggesting that they can lessen their chances of sexual victimisation 
by altering their behaviours, dress, company, levels of intoxication or chosen spatial patterns.23 
Women may take such messages on board (subconsciously or otherwise), modifying their 
behaviours and/or appearance to deflect male attention and potential harm.24 Guarding against 
violence through moderating one’s alcohol or illicit drug consumption, not being alone at night 
or in less populated spaces, or avoiding being considered ‘overfriendly’ are evidently gendered 
behaviours which explicitly target women; comparable safeguarding messages do not exist 
for men.25 Maggie Wykes and Kirsty Welsh have demonstrated that traditional approaches to 
gender-based violence against women which focus on the victim’s femininity – or lack thereof 
– but not the perpetrator’s masculinity indicate a tacit acceptance that men will be (sexually) 
violent towards women.26
Criticisms of these women-focused messages have exposed a range of gendered stereotypes 
linked to expected safety measures, deflected culpability and victim responsibilisation.27 
Such sentiments ensure that the obligation for gendered crime prevention is directed towards 
women to lessen their chances of victimisation by reinforcing and naturalising the notion that 
women must manage, negotiate and resist men’s inevitable violence towards them.28 These 
messages are also inherently focused on women’s vulnerability to ‘stranger danger’ rather 
than harm from an intimate partner. As DeKeseredy et al. noted, rape prevention literature 
functions to instil fears that restrict women’s social orientation while keeping them reliant 
upon men who are more likely to harm them.29 This is problematic in that it does not seek to 
reduce harm, but – again – advises how to avoid, lessen or survive it, implying that this form 
of gendered victimisation is an inevitable part of life for women. An enhanced sociolegal focus 
23 N Bedera and K Nordmeyer (2015) ‘“Never go out alone”: An Analysis of College Rape 
Prevention Tips’, Sexuality & Culture 19(3): 533–43. See also: BBC News, ‘Victim blaming: Is it 
a woman’s responsibility to stay safe?’ 10 October 2018, www .bbc .co .uk/ news/ uk -england -45809169. 
24 L Bates (2016) ‘Why should women have to pay the price for “safety” on a daily basis?’ The 
Guardian, 25 November, www .theguardian .com/ lifeandstyle/ womens -blog/ 2016/ nov/ 25/ why -should 
-women -have -to -pay -the -price -for -safety -on -a -daily -basis. 
25 O Brookes (2011) ‘“It’s more like, guys stop doing it!” Young women’s adoption and rejection of 
safety advice when socialising in bars, pubs and clubs’, British Journal of Criminology 51(4): 635–51.
26 M Wykes and M Welsh (2009) Violence, Gender and Justice, London: SAGE.
27 E Stanko (1996) ‘Warnings to Women: Police Advice and Women’s Safety in Britain’, Violence 
Against Women, 2(1): 5–24.
28 S Walklate (1997), ‘Risk and Criminal Victimisation: A Modernist Dilemma?’ British Journal of 
Criminology, 37(1): 35–45.
29 W DeKeseredy, H Burshtyn and C Gordon (1992) ‘Taking Woman Abuse Seriously: A Critical 
Response to the Solicitor General of Canada’s Crime Prevention Advice’, International Review of 
Victimology, 2: 157–67.
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on misogyny would therefore highlight the gendered specificity of these messages and the 
wider patriarchal ideologies informing them.
Deflection techniques are also evident with regard to culpability, with perpetrators (and 
society) shifting the responsibility for harm onto (female) victims. The findings from one 
study illustrated this clearly: research participants were presented with a series of sexually 
disparaging statements taken from popular men’s lifestyle magazines and excerpts from 
defendants’ testimonies during rape trials which depicted women as promiscuous and readily 
available to be sexually conquered, degraded and controlled.30 The findings indicated that 
not only did they find it difficult to correctly identify the statement’s origin, but a significant 
proportion of men agreed with the sentiments expressed; many only changed their minds 
when they discovered that they were agreeing with convicted rapists. This study indicated that 
not only are traditional rape prevention messages targeting the wrong gender – they may be 
redundant altogether if men do not recognise rape apologism, or indeed actual rape.
Gendered (victim) culpability is also evident within the British criminal justice system. 
Many women who report victimisation have found themselves subject to suspicion regarding 
the veracity of their claims, with some facing accusations of falsifying reports, being somehow 
responsible for what happened or even having precipitated the harm.31 The gendered nature of 
the law has been evident in cases where men charged with the murder of their female partner 
have pleaded provocation, usually on the grounds of alleged infidelity, as justification for their 
excessively violent actions.32 Women, conversely, are often held to a much higher legal stand-
ard when they kill their male partners, most usually following a period of sustained domestic 
violence. Elsewhere, women’s safety negotiations when faced with dangerous situations are 
often rescripted within social and criminal justice discourses as evidence of presumed consent 
or compliance. Failure to verbally or physically resist or try to escape is recast as an indication 
of agreement rather than a survival technique.33 This fails to recognise that women may be 
unwilling or unable to prevent unwanted physical harm or sexual activity if they fear an esca-
lation in violence should they not comply with their attacker’s demands.34 Women are all too 
aware of the common ‘raped and murdered’ media narrative present in the reporting of many 
fatal attacks, yet they are still expected to take appropriate action to prevent or resist male 
assailants, even if it may result in further harm.
30 M Horvath, P Hegarty, S Tyler and S Mansfield (2012) ‘“Lights on at the end of the party”: Are 
Lads’ Mags Mainstreaming Dangerous Sexism?’ British Journal of Psychology, 103(4): 454–71.
31 L Ellison and V Munro (2013) ‘Better the Devil You Know? “Real Rape” Stereotypes and the 
Relevance of a Previous Relationship in (Mock) Juror Deliberations’, The International Journal of 
Evidence & Proof, 17(4): 299–322; M Greeson, R Campbell and G Fehler‐Cabral (2016) ‘“Nobody 
deserves this”: Adolescent Sexual Assault Victims’ Perceptions of Disbelief and Victim Blame from 
Police’, Journal of Community Psychology, 44: 90–110.
32 M Burton (2001) ‘Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence – Endangering Women? 
R v. Smith’, Feminist Legal Studies, 9: 247–58; D Tyson (2012) Sex, Culpability and the Defence of 
Provocation, London: Routledge-Cavendish. 
33 S Taylor, L Klein, B Lewis, T Gruenewald, R Gurung and J Updegraff (2000) ‘Biobehavioral 
responses to stress in females: Tend-and-befriend, not fight-or-flight’, Psychological Review, 107(3): 
411–29.
34 J Monckton-Smith (2010) Relating Rape and Murder: Narratives on Sex, Death and Gender, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
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3. THE LEGAL PERIMETERS OF ‘HATE CRIMES’
Discourses around ‘hate crime’ developed from the 1980s onwards and are largely limited to 
areas in the global north, although the acts and behaviours referred to have a much more estab-
lished place in international history. Notable atrocities such as slavery and mass genocide were 
no doubt informed by individual and societal hostilities towards particular groups and aided 
by significantly imbalanced power dynamics between oppressors and the oppressed. However, 
the concept of hate crime that has emerged socially and politically in Western countries is one 
that speaks to more contemporary forms of victimisation. Hostility is understood as beginning 
on a much smaller scale (that is, among individuals or groups) and analyses focus on both 
the individual act and, increasingly, the wider sociopolitical context in which these acts take 
place.35
No specific or singular hate crime legislation exists in England and Wales. Instead, various 
laws have been implemented since the Public Order Act 1986, which prohibited the stirring up 
of hatred on grounds of race, religion and sexual orientation. The racist murder of black teen-
ager Stephen Lawrence in 1993 and subsequent failings by the police investigating his death 
prompted significant criticism about legal protections, leading to the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998. This recognised racial hostility in demarcated offences considered to be ‘racially aggra-
vated crimes’, incurring harsher punishments than their nonaggravated (‘basic’) counterparts. 
The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 amended the 1998 Act to include religious 
hostility as an aggravating factor. Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 intro-
duced the option for enhanced sentences for offences motivated by hostility towards a person’s 
racial identity, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, disability or gender identity. As either 
crimes are aggravated by hostility or sentences are enhanced due to hostility, a two-tier system 
is in operation.36
A differentiation is also made between hate incidents (any incident perceived to be moti-
vated by prejudice or hate) and hate crimes (incidents which constitute a criminal offence). 
This broad definition is designed to capture a range of behaviours, especially those which 
may escalate if not addressed, meaning that for the purposes of reporting, hate crimes are 
subjectively determined by the victim or any other person. Whether or not they are prosecuted 
as such depends on the weight of the available evidence.37 Some advocates of hate crime 
protections have commended this victim-focused approach, as the broad operational definition 
allows for a greater volume of harms to be reported to the police and the potential hostility 
motivator duly investigated. As a result, the recognition of hate crimes in the global north has 
led to a greater level of data capture in many countries, and a higher level of related knowledge 
about targeted victimisation and identity-based prejudice. On the other hand, some hate crime 
sceptics suggest that the subjective element is unusual, not replicated elsewhere in criminal 
law, and risks creating a hierarchy of harm, offences or victims which may in turn shape the 
criminal justice system’s response.
35 N Chakraborti and J Garland (2015) Hate Crime: Impact, Causes & Responses, London: SAGE 
Publications.
36 Note that the legislation refers to hostility, not hate.
37 N Hall (2013) Hate Crime, London: Routledge.
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4. HATE CRIME LEGISLATION AS SYMBOLIC
Hate crime legislation is considered symbolically significant for many reasons, including indi-
cating vulnerability and a person’s heightened exposure to possible victimisation, and offering 
legal protection for historically subjugated identities. Evidence has suggested that hate crimes 
cause more hurt to victims (and their wider communities) than similar crimes that have not 
been motivated by identity hostility.38 This has been used as a basis to justify the differing 
legal responses to crimes motivated by hostility, but confusion remains over what exactly 
constitutes a hate crime and whether hostility towards other identity categories may constitute 
grounds for classifying victimisation as a hate crime.39 In England and Wales, the College of 
Policing has indicated that the five recognised strands ‘are the minimum categories that police 
officers and staff are expected to record’,40 while a 2013 Home Office report similarly stated: 
‘Crimes based on hostility to age, gender, or appearance, for example, can also be hate crimes, 
although they are not part of the five centrally monitored strands.’41
A true commitment to combating hate crime or identity-based victimisation could address 
prejudice on the basis of the offender’s expression of hostility towards any given factor 
(for example, political ideology or occupation).42 Several judges have used their discretion 
to deviate from the proscribed characteristics to indicate that an offence was motivated by 
hatred of a person’s identity characteristic. For example, the judge presiding over the Sophie 
Lancaster murder case described the attack as a hate crime (in this case, against the goth sub-
culture) during his summing up of the trial.43 Schweppe describes such decisions as evidence 
of a necessary ‘depoliticizing’ of the hate crimes from identities to facts: ‘juries (or triers of 
fact) [should] determine whether, on the basis of the evidence before them, a hate crime was 
committed, rather than curtailing the operation of the legislation to a limited number of (albeit 
fully deserving) victim groups.’44
Analyses of hate crimes therefore foreground the perpetrator’s prejudice in a unique way. 
This may be considered progressive as it situates the fault with the offender, but regressive 
unless the wider sociocultural context of such prejudice is also examined. As Barbara Perry 
notes, analyses of hate crimes tend to focus more on the individual act or actor and look away 
from the contextual framework in which they have acted.45 Drawing on this perspective, Betsy 
38 B Perry and S Alvi (2012) ‘“We are all vulnerable”: The in terrorem effects of hate 
crimes’, International Review of Victimology, 18(1): 57–71. 
39 M Duggan (2013) ‘Working with Victims: Values and Validations’ in M. Cowburn, M. Duggan, 
A. Robinson and P. Senior (eds) The Values of Criminology and Community Justice, Bristol: The Policy 
Press.
40 College of Policing (2014) Hate Crime Operational Guidance, http:// library .college .police .uk/ 
docs/ college -of -policing/ Hate -Crime -Operational -Guidance .pdf at 7.
41 Home Office (2013) An Overview of Hate Crime in England and Wales, https:// assets .publishing 
.service .gov .uk/ government/ uploads/ system/ uploads/ attachment _data/ file/ 266358/ hate -crime -2013 .pdf 
at 11. 
42 N Chakraborti and J Garland (2012) ‘Reconceptualizing Hate Crime Victimization through the 
Lens of Vulnerability and “Difference”’, Theoretical Criminology, 16(4): 499–514. 
43 J Garland (2010) ‘Victimization of Goths and the Boundaries of Hate Crime’, in N. Chakraborit 
(ed) Hate Crime: Concepts, Policy, Future Directions, London: Willan. 
44 J Schweppe (2012) ‘Defining Characteristics and Politicising Victims: A Legal Perspective’, 
Journal of Hate Studies, 10(1): 173–98 at 182–3.
45 B Perry (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes, London: Routledge.
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Stanko suggests that the term ‘hate crime’ is therefore disingenuous in that it fails to recognise 
the wider sociocultural backdrop against which acts of identity-based victimisation occur: 
‘using the terminology of ‘hate crime’ obscures the way in which violence, its resources rein-
forced with institutional discourses about violence, and the manner in which different people 
confront and challenge everyday forms of intimidation, are distorted by faulty logic.’46
Hate crimes are ‘message crimes’ in that they symbolise the negative sentiment held by the 
perpetrator against the victim’s identity and/or wider community. These acts do not exist in 
a vacuum; therefore, examining individual and societal discourse is necessary to understand 
how and why some forms of violence and hostility are considered justifiable by those who act 
on their prejudices.
5. VIEWING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN THROUGH 
A HATE CRIME FRAMEWORK
In 1999, Ben Bowling indicated that in order to explain hate crime, the analysis needed to 
move away from the characteristics of victims and on to the characteristics of offenders.47 
Within this, an exploration of the nature of the victim–perpetrator relationship as well as the 
social processes directing the perpetrator’s hostility to that victim’s group would facilitate 
new knowledge where previous assumptions had reigned. Similar sentiments were expressed 
by Stanko, who noted that the founding premise of hate crime is that the prejudice is rooted in 
the abusive individual, which is directed at the identity characteristic being displayed by the 
selected victim.48 Looking at gender-based victimisation from a hate crime perspective may 
allow for a more nuanced understanding of what drives a perpetrator to victimise. In terms 
of gender, it brings masculinity into focus. Discussing the ‘maleness’ of hate crime, Tomsen 
writes about the ‘masculinity turn’ – the ways in which male identities are created and repro-
duced through criminal enterprise – in order to outline the marginalised forms of masculinity 
which tend to predominate in hate crime scenarios.49 Exploring protest masculinities (such 
as young, urban, working class) and the victimisation of socially subordinated masculinities 
(such as effeminate gay men), Tomsen suggests that the ‘deviant positioning of male homo-
sexuality in the practices and discourses that reproduce social understandings of masculinity’ 
form a backdrop for understanding violent displays by groups of heterosexual young men.50 
In other words, young men are simultaneously defining and displaying their masculinity 
46 E Stanko (2001) ‘Re-Conceptualising the Policing of Hatred: Confessions and Worrying 
Dilemmas of a Consultant’, Law and Critique, 12(3): 309–29, at 328. 
47 B Bowling (1999) Violent Racism: Victimization, Policing, and Social Context, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
48 E Stanko (2001) ‘Re-Conceptualising the Policing of Hatred: Confessions and Worrying 
Dilemmas of a Consultant’, Law and Critique, 12(3): 309–29.
49 S Tomsen (2001) ‘Hate Crimes and Masculinity: New Crimes, New Responses and Some Familiar 
Patterns’, The 4rd National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia: New Crimes or New Responses, 
http:// aic .gov .au/ en/ events/ aic %20upcoming %20events/ 2001/ ~/ media/ conferences/ outlook4/ tomsen 
.ashx/ .
50 S Tomsen (2001) ‘Hate Crimes and Masculinity: New Crimes, New Responses and Some Familiar 
Patterns’, The 4rd National Outlook Symposium on Crime in Australia: New Crimes or New Responses. 
http:// aic .gov .au/ en/ events/ aic %20upcoming %20events/ 2001/ ~/ media/ conferences/ outlook4/ tomsen 
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within the perimeters of heteronormativity. Barbara Perry also suggests that theorising hate 
crime as a method by which perpetrators simultaneously position themselves as different from 
and dominant over victims illustrates the wider context of oppression informing the power 
relations between the two groups.51 Similarly, then, men who display power in abusive rela-
tionships or through violent acts towards women could be seen as ‘doing gender’ in that they 
are performing socially structured notions of masculinity. However, care needs to be taken that 
this individual pathology does not overlook wider social and cultural attitudes and behaviours 
which inform and sustain (and often condone) such prejudice.
A hate crime framework therefore foregrounds the perpetrator’s hostilities and related moti-
vations for acts of targeted victimisation; all culpability is theirs. Applying this framework of 
analysis to gender-based victimisation, particularly violence against women and girls, offers 
new ways of exploring how men’s hostility towards women can be addressed differently 
in law. This is important in light of ongoing discussions about how to better recognise and 
respond to gender-based victimisation using hate crime laws. But these discussions are not 
new: almost two decades ago Jacobs and Potter, though sceptical of hate crime categorisations, 
suggested that ‘crimes against women would seem to be the most obvious candidate for recog-
nition as hate crime’.52 They highlighted the case of Marc Lepiné, who, on 6 December 1989, 
entered an engineering class at the University of Montreal in Canada, separated the male and 
female students, declared his hatred of feminists, then opened fire on the women in the room 
with a semiautomatic rifle before rampaging through the university for a further 30 minutes. 
Lepiné killed 14 young women before eventually turning the gun on himself. His suicide note 
revealed that he blamed his failings on women, most of whom he perceived to be feminists.
The 2009/10 and 2010/11 incarnations of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) 
listed ‘gender’ as one of the options for discerning on what basis a person has been a victim of 
a hate crime.53 Despite this not being a recognised hate crime strand, a significant proportion 
of people indicated that they had suffered such victimisation. Since then, debates around rec-
ognising gender hostility in hate crime legislation have accelerated. In 2016, Nottinghamshire 
police force began recording misogynistic hate crime; several other forces followed suit, 
deciding whether to address gender or misogyny accordingly. This distinction is important 
as the majority of gender-based incidents involve the targeting of women – either a specific 
woman, or women more generally. Examples of this range from online campaigns against 
women in the public eye (such as the case of Caroline Criado Perez54) through to women in 
public spaces being subjected to sexual or vulgar verbal harassment from strangers. More 
often than not there is a threatening element to this abuse: men who shout sexually suggestive 
commands or propositions to a lone (often young) woman draw attention to her, humiliate and 
disempower her and make it difficult for her to retaliate, as this may incite further aggression. 
51 B Perry (2001) In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. London: Routledge.
52 J Jacobs and K Potter (1998) Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, at 19.
53 The CSEW was known as the British Crime Survey between 1981 and 2014, but was changed to 
reflect the fact that only respondents – and information – relating to England and Wales was sought and 
represented.  
54 Caroline Criado-Perez was subjected to a torrent of online abuse after campaigning for Jane 
Austen to be featured on a banknote. See: ‘Two jailed for Twitter abuse of feminist campaigner’, 
The Guardian, 24 January 2014, www .theguardian .com/ uk -news/ 2014/ jan/ 24/ two -jailed -twitter -abuse 
-feminist -campaigner. 
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The decision taken by some forces to focus on misogyny (and therefore women as targets) 
rather than gender may be indicative of the growing awareness of women’s disproportionate 
vulnerability to harm from men.55
Currently, the extent to which women can avail themselves of hate crime laws to address 
targeted victimisation depends on whether they possess another recognised identity charac-
teristic towards which hostility was directed. Valerie Jenness highlights how gender has been 
routinely overlooked in hate crimes against women even though the victim was specifically 
targeted because of her gender as well as her other identity characteristics.56 She outlines the 
case of Darrell David Rice, who professed a hatred for lesbians and had actively intimidated 
and assaulted several women before killing Julianne Marie Williams and Laura Winans, two 
women he came across in Shenandoah National Park in the US. He bound and gagged them 
before slitting their throats. Rice stated that he had intentionally selected women to assault 
‘because they are more vulnerable than men’, that he ‘hates gays,’ and that the victims in this 
case ‘deserved to die because they were lesbian whores’.57
The links between homophobia and misogyny are well documented in queer academic 
perspectives on antigay and antilesbian violence. Steven Tomsen and Gail Mason suggest 
that feminist theory’s traditional focus on gender at the expense of sexuality has overlooked 
some core issues regarding the victimisation of women, and of lesbian women in particular.58 
Feminism has been invaluable for recognising and challenging inequality and violence against 
women, but this has been done largely by, and for, heterosexual women. Tomsen and Mason 
suggest that much can be learnt from studies on victimisation of gay men and transgender 
people, as this often demonstrates how attackers are displaying prejudices against feminisation 
as inferred by the victim’s gender and/or sexual deviation. These prejudices are often reminis-
cent of condemnatory legal and social discourses where persecutory rhetoric has a historical 
basis that seeks to elicit culpability from the victim’s actions, identity or behaviour. However, 
due to the way in which ‘communities’ are understood and constructed, women as a gender 
category do not constitute a ‘group’, as they lack a discernible community identity. Intimate 
partner violence – domestic abuse being a particular case in point – poses specific problems as 
individual women are seen as being in danger from individual men; these men are not seen as 
a risk to ‘women’, just to that particular woman.
6. THE COMPLEXITIES OF INCLUSION
The usefulness of criminalising individual prejudices in a structurally unequal society has been 
queried by those working in the VAWG arena. Hannah Mason-Bish indicated how gender 
was omitted from hate crime policy in Scotland due to strong opposition to its inclusion from 
55 E Stanko (2001) ‘Re-Conceptualising the Policing of Hatred: Confessions and Worrying 
Dilemmas of a Consultant’, Law and Critique, 12(3): 309–29, at 309. 
56 V Jenness (2003) ‘Engendering Hate Crime Policy: Gender, the “Dilemma of Difference,” and the 
Creation of Legal Subjects’, Journal of Hate Studies, 2: 73–97.
57 Ibid, at 74.
58 S Tomsen and G Mason (2001) ‘Engendering Homophobia: Violence, Sexuality and Gender 
Conformity’, Journal of Sociology, 37(3): 257–73.
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the Scottish Executive’s Violence against Women Unit.59 The Unit had suggested that such 
a perspective was reductive as a domestic abuse perpetrator usually focuses their abuse on par-
ticular women and may not necessarily be motivated by the victim’s gender. Mason-Bish also 
indicated that policy makers were reluctant to include gender as it was seen as mostly private 
victimisation by intimate partner and therefore different to other forms of hate crime, which 
are often seen to be public and involving strangers. Research by Paul Iganski has demonstrated 
that most hate crime victimisation occurs within the remit of an ordinary person’s everyday 
activities – as opposed to being perpetrated by members of organisations characterised by 
their particular prejudice – which indicates that in many cases the perpetrators of hate crimes 
and violence against women may be the same people.60 How these perpetrators are treated, 
however, will depend on whether they have committed a ‘hate crime’ or ‘violence against 
women’.
The language of hate crime has been targeted by those who are critical of the concept, 
warning against the danger of becoming too familiar with what ‘hate crime’ may or may not 
include. Stanko illustrates that a label as seemingly evident as ‘domestic violence’ can obscure 
the complexities, realities and experiences of this type of victimisation for those affected by it, 
despite its being a form of victimisation which cuts across cultures and genders.61 It is on this 
basis that she suggests ‘targeted violence’ as a more useful way of understanding, responding 
to and preventing men’s violence against women, as ‘targeted violence’ necessarily questions 
the reasons why that victim was targeted and, in doing so, highlights the perpetrator’s preju-
dices. From there, it is possible to investigate these prejudices within their wider sociocultural 
or sociopolitical context.
Contrastingly, theorists such as Judith Butler would discourage viewing gender as a cate-
gory of hate crime, mainly on the basis that this further polarises the actors involved.62 Butler's 
work advocates that men and women perform their gender according to culturally specific 
social stereotypes, as evidenced by parodies such as drag and crossdressing as well as by 
butch lesbians and camp gay men. Envisaging gender-based hate crime laws would merely 
exacerbate already constructed differences and reinforce binaries that privilege one demar-
cated group over another. Setting some people’s victimisation apart by virtue of their socially 
defined characteristics (such as race, faith, sexual orientation) indicates the need to ‘perform’ 
these differences in order to see them as being separate and therefore vulnerable to persecution.
The positionality and conceptualisation of the victim is a key in differentiating between hate 
crime and gender-based violence frameworks of analysis. Following a hate crime, victims are 
rarely (if ever) asked to account for what they may have done to incite the offence, as to do so 
would detract from the fact that the perpetrator, not the victim, was to blame. Contrastingly, 
(female) victims of sexual assaults are routinely asked about what they were wearing, whether 
they had been drinking, if they were under the influence of controlled substances, why they 
were walking alone late at night or had taken a route considered to be unsafe, or are made to 
59 H Mason-Bish (2010) ‘Future Challenges for Hate Crime Policy’, in N. Chakraborti (ed) Hate 
Crime: Concepts, Causes, Controversies, London: Willan, at 70.
60 P Iganski (2008) ‘Hate Crime’ and the City, Bristol: Policy Press.
61 E Stanko (2001) ‘Re-Conceptualising the Policing of Hatred: Confessions and Worrying 
Dilemmas of a Consultant’, Law and Critique, 12(3): 309–29.
62 J Butler (1993) Bodies that Matter, London: Routledge.
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account for any behaviour which implies culpability in their victimisation.63 Similarly, the 
reporting process involved with hate crime prioritises the victim’s perception of why they 
were targeted: many women who are considered at an increased level of vulnerability or risk 
of harm find that this is often used against them when they are chastised for not safeguard-
ing themselves more effectively.64 Some gender-specific crimes committed by men against 
women are not evidently rooted in prejudice, hate or any specific emotion, but rather purely 
because of the power afforded to the perpetrator to act, possibly with impunity. These crimes, 
in which women are disproportionately harmed by men, destabilise the ‘hate’ dynamic of hate 
crimes. Nonetheless, the hate crime framework of analysis indicates that the female victim 
does not precipitate her victimisation; rather, the blame and accountability lies with the per-
petrator. This is fundamentally applicable to the power differentials being displayed in acts of 
men’s violence against women.
7. CONCLUSION
Current hate crime laws are useful for indicating trends and patterns of experience, but may 
prove ineffectual to prevent harm. Like most legislation, laws pertaining to hate crime are 
reactive; these laws do not necessarily prevent crime. Categorising gender or misogyny as 
recognised grounds for hate crime may prove symbolic in that it will vastly increase, or even 
skew, hate crime statistics, as women are already experiencing the types of victimisation that 
such laws would seek to recognise.
63 M van der Bruggen and A Grubb (2014) ‘A Review of the Literature relating to Rape Victim 
Blaming: An Analysis of the Impact of Observer and Victim Characteristics on Attribution of Blame in 
Rape Cases’, Aggression and Violent Behavior, 19(5): 523–31.
64 For example, sex workers or younger women in care are often more vulnerable to experiencing 
harm, yet are held more responsible if and when this happens. 
